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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 
13835 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
B R I E F I N S U P P O R T OF A P P E L L A N T ' S 
MOTION F O R R E H E A R I N G 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E N A T U R E 
OF T H E CASE 
The Appellant appealed from, a sentence and com-
mitment of the Third District Court. Appellant is now 
before this court on a motion for rehearing after this 
court rendered an opinion denying Appellant's request 
to be resentenced with credit for jail time prior to sen-
tencing. 
D I S P O S I T I O N ON A P P E A L 
Appellant appealed to this court from a sentence 
1 
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and commitment in which the sentencing court imposed 
a maximum sentence and refused to give credit for pre-
sentence jail time incurred by Appellant due to financial 
inability to make bail. In an opinion filed February 
14, 1975, this court affirmed the judgement of the 
lower court. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON R E H E A R I N G 
Appellant seeks to have this court vacate its opinion 
affirming the lower court and to remand the case for 
resentencing with instructions to allow Appellent cred-
it against the maximum sentence for time spent in jail 
by reason of Appellant's financial inability to make bail. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Appellant was booked into Salt Lake County Jail 
on June 17, 1974 under a charge of auto theft. H e was 
found indigent by the Salt Lake City Court and was 
appointed counsel (T. 2). After a continuance of the 
preliminary hearing date at the request of Respondent 
(T. 2), Appellent was bound over for trial in Third 
District Court. On the date set for trial, August 30, 
1974, Appellent entered a plea of guilty to a lesser in-
cluded Class A Misdemeanor (T. 15, 29). 
Appellant waved time for sentencing and was sen-
tenced to the maximum sentence (T. 15, 29). The sen-
tencing court refused to give appellant credit for pre-
sentence time incurred by reason of Appellent's inabil-
ity to make bail (T. 30). 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H I S COURT E R R E D BY R E N D E R I N G 
I T S O P I N I O N IN T H I S A P P E A L W I T H O U T 
C O N S I D E R A T I O N O F P O I N T IV OF A P P E L -
LANT'S I N I T I A L B R I E F . 
The opinion of this court filed on February 14, 
1975, is based upon two grounds: the prior opinion of 
this court in State v. Jaramillo, 25 Utah 2d 328, 481 P . 
2d 394; and a factual distinction between the instant 
case and North Carolina v. Pierce cited in Appellant's 
initial brief. Neither of these grounds meet Appellant's 
strongest argument presented on appeal. 
Appellant acknowledges that Pierce involved time 
served pending appeal and retrial and is therefore not 
factually identical to this appeal. The arguments in 
Points I and I I I of Appellant's initial brief and the use 
of Pierce in those arguments was only by way of anal-
ogy. Point IV of Appellant's initial brief deals more 
squarely with the facts in the instant case. With the 
exception of Williams v. Illinois, all cases cited in Point 
IV relate directly to the denial of equal protection which 
results when a defendant is not given credit for pre-
sentence or pre-commjitment incarceration served be-
cause of financial inability to post bail. 
The opinion of this court and the initial brief of 
Respondent do not squarely meet the facts of this case 
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and argument made in Point IV of Appellant's initial 
brief. In support of this contention, Appellant submits 
the following sub-points 1(A) and 1(B) to be consid-
ered in conjunction with Point IV of Appellant's initial 
Brief on Appeal. 
P O I N T 1(A) 
STATE V. JARAMILLO IS SIGNIFI-
CANTLY D I S T I N G U I S H A B L E FROM T H E 
I N S T A N T CASE. I T W O U L D B E A D E N I A L 
OF E Q U A L P R O T E C T I O N TO E X T E N D 
JARAMILLO TO R E F U S E C R E D I T F O R 
P R E - S E N T E N C E INCARCATION W H E R E 
S U C H I N C A R C E R A T I O N R E S U L T E D 
F R O M F I N A N C I A L I N A B I L I T Y TO P O S T 
B A I L A N D T H E F A I L U R E TO G I V E CRED-
I T R E S U L T S I N I N C A R C E R A T I O N B E Y O N D 
T H E M A X I M U M L E G A L S E N T E N C E . 
In the State v. Jaramillo, 25 Utah 2d 328, 481 P . 
2d 394, this court held that a sentencing court did not 
have to credit the face of a commitment for an offense 
on which the dedendant had already served time pend-
ing appeal and reconviction. The specific sentence in 
Jaramillo was for an indeterminate term of five years 
to life and the opinion of the court pointed to the impos-
sibility of making an advance computation of the date 
on which the maximum; sentence would expire. The 
ruling in Jaramillo was also based on reasoning that the 
4 
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Board of Pardons should and would consider the time 
served prior to re-commitment in determining an ap-
propriate parole date. 
This same reasoning can be applied where a judge 
sentences to less than the maximum term for a misde-
meanor. Similar to the position of the Board of Par-
dons, the court can determine an appropriate release 
date based on the defendant's background, the facts of 
the case, and the time the defendant has been incarcer-
ated prior to sentencing. If a defendant has served two 
ninths prior to sentencing and the judge feels that six 
months confinement if called for on a possible twelve-
month sentence, the judge can simply impose a sentence 
of four months. There are only a few small practical 
differences between sentencing such a defendant to six 
months with credit or four months without credit. 
This reasoning and the similar rationale of Java-
millo do not hold up under the equal protection argu-
ment made under the facts in the instant case. Appel-
lant was financially unable to post bail and therefore 
spent seventy days in jail prior to sentencing. Appel-
lant was then sentenced to the maximum term and de-
nied credit for his seventy days of pre-sentence incarcer-
ation. The result is that Appellant is held in confine-
ment beyond the maximum time authorized by the 
legislature for his particular offense. His economic 
status has thereby subjected him to more severe treat-
ment than similarly situated defendants who have the 
resources to post bail. 
5 
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Some judges may impose a maximum sentence 
only in cases involving high culpability or an extensive 
prior record. This, however, does not justify a denial 
of equal protection within the class of defendants who 
receive a maximum sentence. "Equality of treatment 
of classes similarly situated must be maintained." 
Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, at 496, 206 P . 
2d 153, at 164. 
Under the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, economic status is a constitution-
ally prohibited basis for different treatment of similarly 
situated defendants. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 
(1970). Yet, this exact type of discrimination against 
Appellent has been affirmed as a result of this court 
rendering its opinion without considering Williams and 
the other cases submitted in Pont IV of Appellant's in-
itial brief. Appellant's economic status is the only rea-
son he is facing incarceration beyond the maximum 
time which could be imposed on a similarly classified 
defendant who could post bail. 
P O I N T 1(B) 
T H E CASES C I T E D I N R E S P O N D E N T ' S 
I N I T I A L B R I E F A R E NOT I N P O I N T W I T H 
T H E TACTS O F T H I S CASE A N D T H E AU-
T H O R I T I E S C I T E D I N P O I N T IV O F A P -
P E L L A N T ' S I N I T I A L B R I E F . 
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The cases cited in Point IV of the Respondent's 
initial brief are used by Respondent in a way which mis-
represents the actual holding in those cases. 
On page 8 of Respondent's brief, Sobeli v. Attor-
ney General of the U.•$., 400 F . 2d 986, is cited for the 
proposition that a defendant who is financially unable 
to make bail is not denied equal protection by a refusal 
of the sentencing court to grant credit for pre-sentence 
confinement. This, however, was not the holding 
reached in Sobeli. 
The court in Sobell was asked to consider two en-
tirely separate issues: 1) whether the defendant could 
use the Administrative Proceedure Act and the Declar-
atory Judgement Act to exercise a federal statutory 
right which allowed credit for time served prior to sen-
tencing; and 2) whether the defendant was entitled to 
credit for time spent in jail pending appeal. As to the 
first issue the court held it should not hear the matter 
because the sentencing court was the proper forum for 
the defendant to assert his claim. Contrary to what this 
court may have been led to believe by Respondent's 
brief, equal protection was neither raised or discussed 
in Sobell as being a basis for receiving pre-sentence 
credit. 
In regard to the second issue in Sobell, whether the 
defendant had an equal protection right to receive cred-
it for confinement pending appeal, the court made the 
following statement: 
7 
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I t is true that, as between one who could afford 
bail and one who could not, it worked a hardship 
on the latter if he elected not to commence serv-
ing his sentence. But this consequence flowed 
from what we must assume was a proper impris-
onment. While the result may be unfair it is not 
sufficiently invidious to reach constitutional pro-
portions. 400 F . 2d at 990. (Emphasis added.) 
Except for the emphasized portion, this quote was er-
roneously cited by Respondent as being the basis of the 
court's decision on the first issue in SobelL The section 
of the above quote which is emphasized herein but omit-
ted in Respondent's brief clearly limits and distinguishes 
the basis for the equal protection decision in Sobell. The 
defendant had elected not to commence the service of 
his sentence pending appeal, and it was under this criti-
cally distinguishing factor that the court held a failure 
to credit time served was not so unfair as to reach con-
stitutional proportions. 
Similarly, Sullivan v. Cupp, 462 P . 2d 455 (Or. 
1970) cited at page 8 of Respondent's initial brief is not 
in point. The defendant in that case had also elected to 
remain in jail instead of starting his prison commitment 
pending appeal. 
The next case used by Respondent is Rigney v. 
Hendrick, 355 F . 2d 710, cited and quoted at page 9 in 
Point IV of Respondent's brief. In using Rigney > Re-
spondent creates the false impression that the issue in 
8 
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the case was whether an indigent defendant had an 
equal protection right to credit for pre-trial confine-
ment. In fact, the case deals with a substantially differ-
ent issue. The question in Rigney was whether equal 
protection of law was violated because jail inmates who 
could not post bail were required to participate in line-
ups while those who were free on bail could only be used 
in a line-up if they were arrested and charged with the 
crime for which they would be viewed. 
The last case cited in Point IV of Respondent's 
brief, United States v. Erwing, 268 F . Supp. 879, is also 
in a different ball park. That case relates to the criteria 
which should be used in setting bail and does not address 
the issue of whether a defendant has a right to credit for 
pre-sentence confinement. 
Respondent's initial brief cites several cases in 
which credit for time served was not allowed. These 
cases and others that can be found with similar holdings 
involve one or more of the following significant distinc-
tions : the sentence actually imposed plus the time of pre-
sentence incarceration did not exceed the maximum 
sentence; the sentence was for an indeterminate term; 
there was no showing of discrimination based on the fact 
the defendant was indigent; the offense was not bail-
able; the defendant exercised a power of election to re-
main in jail instead of being committed to prison pend-
ing appeal. 
9 
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The critical distinctions between the cases relied 
upon by Respondent and the significant facts in the in-
stant case is exemplified by a comparison of GremilUon 
v. Henderson, 425 F . 2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1970) cited at 
page four of Respondent's initial brief and the subse-
quent decisions of the Fifth Circuit in Hart v. Hender-
son, 449 F . 2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971) cited at pages six and 
eleven of Appellant's initial brief. 
In GremilUon the defendant had not been given 
the mjaximum sentence and there was no showing that 
his failure to make bond was based on economic status. 
Under these circumstances the court held the defend-
ant did not have a right to credit for pre-sentence incar-
ceration. GremilUon, however, is clearly distinguish-
able from the instant case because Appellant's status as 
an indigent resulted in a term of incarceration beyond 
the maximum legal sentence. 
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hart v. Henderson 
states : 
We hold here that the inability of an indigent 
criminal defendant to make bond should not re-
sult in extending the duration of his imprison-
ment beyond the statutory maximum. 449 F . 
2d 183, at 185. 
The holding in Hart is reaffirmed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Hill v. Wainwright, 465 F . 2d 414 
(1972) where it is stated: 
10 
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A state prisoner who has received the maximum 
imposable prison sentence for an offense must be 
given credit for all pre-sentence jail time if he 
was unable to make bail due to his indigence. 
165 F . 2d 414, at 415. 
CONCLUSION 
This case involves twro significant facts. Appel-
lant was given the maximum statutory sentence and he 
was not allowed credit for pre-sentence confinement in-
curred by reason of his indigency. Because of these 
two factors, Appellant was denied equal protection of 
law vis a vis a defendant who similarly received the 
maximum sentence but who was financially able to post 
bail. 
This court erred in rendering its opinion in this ap-
peal without addressing the equal protection argument 
presented in Point IV of Appellant's initial brief. This 
court should therefore reconsider this appeal and re-
mand the case to the lower court with instructions to 
credit the appellant's commitment with the time Appel-
lant spent in jail prior to sentencing the lower court. 
In contrast to the result reached in the opinion this 
court filed February 14, 1975, Appellant invites the at-
tentiin of this court to four recent decisions from neigh-
boring jurisdictions: Anglin v. State, 525 P . 2d 34 
(Nevada, 1974), holding equal protection requires that 
those who are financially unable to make bail must be 
11 
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given pre-sentence credit towards the maximum term, 
the minimum term, and good time credits; Reanier v. 
Smith, 517 P . 2d 949 (Wash., 1974), holding that equal 
protection requires credit for pre-sentence hospital de-
tention and credit towards the mandatory minimum on 
a non-bailable offense with a life top; Thompson v. 
State, 496 P. 2d 651 (Alaska, 1972) ordering that cred-
it on an indeterminate sentence be granted a defendant 
who could not make bail and negotiated a plea during 
trial; and State V. Sutton, 521 P . 2d 1008 (Ariz., 1970) 
holding that incarceration beyond the statutory limit 
violates the principle of separation of powers by allow-
ing the executive or judicial branch to punish a defend-
ant in excess of that which the legislature has allowed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK W. KUNKLER 
RAYMOND S. SHUEY 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
343 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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